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Abstract
Once the system is compromised, the forensics and investigation are always executed after the attacks and the
loss of some useful instant evidence. Since there is no log information necessary for analyzing an attack cause
after the cyber incident occurs, it is difficult to analyze the cause of an intrusion even after an intrusion event is
recognized. Moreover, in an advanced cyber incident such as advanced persistent threats, several months or
more are expended in only analyzing a cause, and it is difficult to find the cause with conventional security
equipment. In this paper, we introduce a network intrusion forensics system for collecting and preserving the
evidence of an intrusion, it is called Cyber Black Box that is deployed in Local Area Network environment. It
quickly analyzes a cause of an intrusion event when the intrusion event occurs, and provides a function of
collecting evidence data of the intrusion event. The paper also describes the experimental results of the network
throughput performance by deploying our proposed system in an experimental testbed environment.
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INTRODUCTION
Recently, cyber-attacks against public communications networks are getting more sophisticated intelligent and
varied. Moreover, in some cases, one local domain could make systematic attacks against another domain to
steal its confidential information and intellectual property. Therefore, the issue of cyber-attacks is now regarded
as a new major threat to national security. The conventional way of operating individual information security
systems such as IDS (Intrusion Detection System) and IPS (Intrusion Prevention System) may not be sufficient
to cope with those attacks committed by highly-motivated attackers with significant resources. For real-time
response cyber threats, not only individual security system, but also global cooperative security management
system should be provided since there are global problems which cannot be solved by any single entity as well
as single domain or single company. For a systematic response to the cyber threat, the level of threats, the level
of risk assessment, and a step-by-step alarm are required.
Table 1: Description of Network Forensic Analysis Tools (NFATs) (Pilli et al., 2010)
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Current cyber incident response is always after the attacks occur, which always lose some important data of the
intrusion. To solve these security issues, we need some new approaches to enhance the investigation of the
network attack. A generic process model for network forensics is proposed which is built on various existing
models of digital forensics. Computer Forensics deals with the collection and analysis of data from computer
systems, networks, communication streams and storage media in an admissible manner (Osles, L., 2001).
Otherwise, network forensics deals with capture, recording, and analysis of network traffic for detecting
intrusions and investigating them in order to discover evidential information about the source of security attacks
(Gary, P., 2001).
The functionality of various Network Forensic Analysis Tools (NFATs) and network security monitoring tools,
available for forensics examiners is discussed in (Pilli et al., 2010). Computer forensic is the science of
acquiring, preserving, retrieving, and presenting data that has been processed electronically and stored on
computer media (Osles, L., 2001). Network forensics is commonly used to describe the task of analyzing
information collected on active networks from various intrusion detection, auditing, and monitoring capabilities
for the purpose of protection. The network forensics tools always combine the ability to passively monitor,
capture all network traffic, analyze traffic, track down security violations and protect against future violations
and attacks. The essential functions of network forensics tool is to capture network traffic, to analyze the traffic
according to the user’s needs, to discover useful and interesting things about the analyzed traffic (Corey et al.,
2002; Reith et al., 2002; Manzano et al., 2001; Davidoff et al., 2012). For the purpose of the network forensics,
we always need the logging system to capture the network traffic fully. There are many tools for building
network traffic analysis and statistical event records (Ioannidis et al., 2002; McCanne et al., 1993; Anagnostakis
et al., 2001; Risso et al., 2001). They often use a promiscuous packet interface to pass visible traffic into an
internally decision engine which discloses the content of the packets and counting them into statistical data and
logging key details into backend disks (Rizzo et al., 2012; Deri et al., 2013). In our system, we will use the
logging approach for the information gathering, including network flow, windows PE (Portable Executable) files
and so on. After obtaining the network traffic data, forensics analysis is needed. In this paper, we present the
architecture of a real time network intrusion forensics system, which can expedite the investigation of the
incident and improve the ability of emergence response. The remaining of the paper is organized as follows:
First, technical goals and design approaches of the system are discussed. And then the system architecture and
technical functions are described, we explain the experimental results and give the conclusion in the last section.

TECHNICAL GOALS AND DESIGN APPROACHES
Cyber Black Box System Goals
In the network security field, a cyber intrusion event denotes a case of attacking an information communication
network and a system associated with the information communication network in a way such as hacking, a
computer virus, a logic bomb, a mail bomb, and so on. In the related works, since analysis is mainly used as an
action against a cyber intrusion event, there are limitations in quick cause analysis and post-action. They cannot
give a complete picture for the forensics analysis when the attacks are end. In addition, since there is no log
information necessary for analyzing an attack cause after the cyber incident occurs, it is difficult to analyze the
cause of an attack.

Figure 1: Technical design of cyber black box for network forensics
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Accordingly, the goals of our cyber black box system are security response and forensics. It quickly analyzes a
cause of an intrusion event when the intrusion event occurs, and provides a function of collecting evidence data
of the intrusion event. Figure 1 shows that the cyber black box system includes a data collector configured to
collect entire packet data, flow data, and a portable executable (PE) file from monitored network traffic and a
server configured to analyze a cause of a cyber intrusion event and reproduce the cyber intrusion event, based on
the collected entire packet data, flow data, and PE file. It also provides the process in data on the authenticity,
integrity, reliability, originality, such as the securing by the evidence legally binding.
Traffic & Flow Information Gathering
The proposed system saves the audit data and digests information of the intrusion. It can gather the network
traffic and flow data (e.g., Netflow), and send to the forensics server. Network traffic capture may become the
bottleneck of the system when the traffic is huge, but the waiving of the some traffic may result in the losing of
trace or evidence. The solution of the trade-off depends on the burden of real time traffic. We developed a
network interface card dealing with 10Gbps traffic without loss of traffic data. It may encode the entire packet
data, the flow data, and the PE file which are stored in the buffer as a file having the PCAP format. It may also
store the entire packet data, the flow data, and the PE file, which are encoded by the encoding unit in units of a
file, as the preservation data.
Transmitted File Reconstruction
The proposed system performs the function of reconstructing the transmitted file which is extracted from the
stored traffic data collected by the cyber black box system, and performs a function for storing additional
metadata that is collected from one file reconfiguration. When a network packet is arrived, it is confirmed
whether the packet includes a PE file or not. If it is, then the packet is collected to reconstruct the PE file from
the packet payload. For reconstructing the correct file, the TCP reassemble functionality has been implemented
as well. Once a PE file is constructed, the file is examined by header analysis technology. Header analysis
technology detects malwares based on the information of PE header. There is lots of information in PE header
for executing a file.
Virtual Volume based Storage Management
Virtual volume management is performed solely for the storage device. Storing the collected data provides
several APIs to execute the traffic information gathering module. The proposed system performs a function to
provide the integrity of the data when stored in the virtual volume storage to preserve the collected data for the
evidence of attacks. Moreover, the storage management supports a write once read many (WROM) function. It
can be understood that the storage unit supporting the WORM function is a storage medium in which data is
written once and from which the data is read a plurality of times like CD-ROMs. Therefore, the storage unit may
preserve the entire packet data, the flow data, and the PE file for a long time.
Cyber Incident Cause Analysis
Cyber incident cause analysis may request the preserved data and management data from a data collector. Here,
the preserved data may include the decoded entire packet data, flow data, PE file, and metadata associated with
the PE file, and the management data may include summary data as well as flow data. The summary data is data
generated by summarizing the entire packet data, the flow data, and the PE file which are classified as the
preserved data. In detail, it also provides the user interface to the cause analysis for performing a function of
analyzing the cause of cyber incidents based on the data collected in the cyber black box system.

SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND TECHNICAL FUCTIONS
In general aspect, a method of collecting evidence data of a cyber intrusion event includes: (1) extracting entire
packet data from monitored network traffic; (2) analyzing the extracted entire packet data based on an Internet
protocol (IP), a port, and a protocol to extract, as flow data, a bundle of packet data having the same feature; (3)
extracting, as a portable executable (PE) file, a bundle of packet data having a PE format from the extracted
entire packet data; (4) temporarily storing in a buffer, and collecting the extracted entire packet data, flow data,
and PE file; (5) applying a hash function to each of the temporarily stored entire packet data, flow data, and PE
file to generate a hash value; and storing, as the evidence data, the generated hash value and the temporarily
stored entire packet data, flow data, and PE file in a storage unit. Figure2 shows the architecture of the proposed
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system, called cyber black box. There are two physical systems in the architecture. We describe the detail
function of each module (block) on the cyber black box system in this section.
From the figure 2, TFGB (Traffic & Flow Gathering Block) block is able to accommodate 10Gbps network
traffic via a network interface card (NIC), store collected packets, extract the traffic information of the network
flow and generate the session data. A method of extracting the flow data can analyze all packet data extracted by
the packet extraction unit, based on an Internet protocol (IP), a port, and a protocol. It may collect packet data
having the same feature in units of a certain time, based on a result of the analysis, and may bundle the packet
data, collected in units of the certain time, in a specific file having the PCAP format to extract one piece of flow
data (or a flow packet). Another method of extracting the flow data can extract the flow data by sampling a
certain-rate packet of entire packet data in a deterministic packet sampling scheme. The extracted flow data may
be temporarily stored in the virtual volume based storage. By connecting a plurality of the hard disk to store a
total of 10Gbps traffic data without loss of traffic to select a structure for storing in parallel. The hash value
generating unit may apply a hash function to each of the entire packet data and the flow data to generate a hash
value (SHA-256), for ensuring data integrity of each of the entire packet data and the flow data which are stored
in the virtual volume based storage. The generated hash value is also stored in the storage unit and is preserved
for a long time.

Figure 2: Architecture of the cyber black box for network intrusion forensics
TFRB (Transmitted File Reconstruction Block) block performs the function of reconstructing the transmitted
file which is extracted from the stored data collected by TFGB, and performs a function for storing additional
metadata that is collected from one file reconfiguration. The transmitted file may be the PE (Portable
Executable) file from the entire packet data extracted from the packet extraction unit. For example, the PE file
extraction unit may select packets having PE file information (or a PE format) in the entire packet data extracted
by the packet extraction unit. It also collects all packets having the selected PE file information, and can
reassemble (or reconfigure) all the collected packets having the PE file information. The extracted PE file is also
temporarily stored in the virtual volume based storage. TFRB provides the ability to analyze the network service
protocols such as HTTP, SMTP, FTP, POP3, and so on. It also determines which protocol a file is sent by and
calculates the hash value (SHA-256) for the file, and stores the metadata information that is collected between
the extracted files in the directory specified in the csv file format.
VSMB (Virtual volume based Storage Management Block) block stores the entire packet data, the flow data, and
the PE file which are encoded by the encoding unit in units of a file as the preserved data. It receives the hash
value that generated by the hash value generation unit, for each of the entire packet data, the flow data, and the
PE file. And then it stores the received hash value as evidence data. Moreover, VSMB block supports a write
once read many (WROM) function to ensure integrity of the stored data in the virtual volume based storage. It
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also prevents the forgery as well as modification of the data stored in the storage. The entire packet data, the
flow data, and the PE file that are stored in the VSMB block and are encoded in units of a file can be supplied to
the server according to a request of the server. That is, when an intrusion event occurs or another necessary case
occurs, the encoded entire packet data, flow data, and PE file can be supplied to the server as the evidence data
including at least one of the management data and the preserved data, for analyzing a cause of the intrusion event
and reproducing the intrusion event. It provides the capability to create or destroy the virtual volumes of the
storage systems for the data protection as well as the file storage management.
IASB (Intrusion Analysis & Scenario generation Block) block provides the user interface to perform a function
of analyzing the cause of the cyber incident based on the data collected in the cyber black box system. That is, it
provides, as various pieces of visual information, an analysis result of the cause of the intrusion event to a user
through a GUI. A method of reproducing the cyber incident can extract a cyber-attack scenario (for example, an
attack time, an IP address where the cyber-attack is performed, and etc.), based on the evidence data which is
collected at a cyber-attack time. It also reconstructs the cyber-attack scenario based on the extracted information
and reproduces a corresponding cyber incident according to the reconstructed attack scenario. The result of the
cause analysis can be supplied to an external system through the external cooperation protocol. The supply of the
analysis result can be limited in order for the result to be supplied to an authenticated external system. That is,
the external cooperation system sets a security grade in an external system and gives an appropriate authority to
the external system according to the set of security grade. The external system may be a security-related system
provided in a security company, a public institution, a portal company, a general company, and so on.

EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the experimental results of the cyber black box system. We designed and implemented
the system using the C programming language on the CentOS Linux 7.1 platform. For all the experiments we
used a single machine with 64GB DDR3 RAM, two Quad-Core 2.6 Ghz CPUs, 4TB SATA-300 32 MB Buffer
7200 rpm disk with a RAID-Z configuration.

(a)

(b)

Figures 3: (a) Experimental Testbed Environment, (b) Network Traffic Throughput Performance test
For experiments we used the network flow data captured over a 12 hour period of one weekday at our testbed
environment. In details, we deployed our proposed system in an experimental testbed with monitoring points at
the network perimeter, in front of warehousing servers, and at the computer Lab as shown in figure 3 (a). We
simulated the scenario where the attack was not detected by IDSs, but anomalies were discovered later at the
victim machine. We also conducted the traffic throughput test with an Agilent N2X tool as shown in figure 3 (b).
It is verified that our proposed system could collect the attack event data and related flow records without the
loss of network packets in a total of 2Gbps traffic. However, we observed that there were some loss of network
packets in case that the size of a packet is less than 128 Byte as shown in table 2.
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Table 2: Summary of network packet processing performance in a total of 2Gbps traffic
P acket S ize
64 B yte

128 B yte

256 B yte

512 B yte

1024 B yte

1518 B yte

R and o m

P o rt

Tx P ackets

A ll P o rts

535,714,286

R x P ackets

Tx p p s

535,553,897 2,976,190

R x pps

lo ss(% )

2,975,299

inb o und

267,857,143

267,777,370 1,488,095

1,487,652

o utb o und

267,857,143

267,776,527 1,488,095

1,487,647

A ll P o rts

304,054,056

304,047,383 1,689,189

1,689,152

inb o und

152,027,028

152,023,714

844,595

844,576

o utb o und

152,027,028

152,023,669

844,595

844,576

A ll P o rts

163,043,480

163,043,480

905,797

905,797

inb o und

81,521,740

81,521,740

452,899

452,899

o utb o und

81,521,740

81,521,740

452,899

452,899

A ll P o rts

84,586,468

84,586,468

469,925

469,925

inb o und

42,293,234

42,293,234

234,962

234,962

o utb o und

42,293,234

42,293,234

234,962

234,962

A ll P o rts

43,103,450

43,103,450

239,464

239,464

inb o und

21,551,725

21,551,725

119,732

119,732

o utb o und

21,551,725

21,551,725

119,732

119,732
162,549

A ll P o rts

29,258,778

29,258,778

162,549

inb o und

14,629,389

14,629,389

81,274

81,274

o utb o und

14,629,389

14,629,389

81,274

81,274

A ll P o rts

55,486,751

55,486,751

308,260

308,260

inb o und

27,743,372

27,743,379

154,130

154,130

o utb o und

27,743,379

27,743,372

154,130

154,130

0.02993928

0.00219468

0

0

0

0

0

For another experimental results, our proposed system collected at least 400,000 flow records per second and
stored those data into the virtual volume based storage which supports WORM function. Figure 4 shows the
experimental results and network traffic throughput performance with 1Gbps LAN optical Interface of N2X tool.
We also confirmed that TFRB block performed the function of reconstructing the transmitted file which was
extracted from the stored traffic packets collected by TFGB block, and performed a function for storing
additional metadata that was collected from one file reconfiguration.

Figure 4: The experimental results and network traffic throughput performance
For the network traffic throughput performance, we used the following formula;
Rx pps * (Packet Size + 12bytes(Inter Packet Gap) + 7bytes(MAC Preamble size) + 1byte(SFD)) * 8bits
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For the overall performance of network traffic processing, we evaluated that our proposed system could keep up
with traffic rates up to 2.0 Gbps for our experimental implementation. We also measured the maximum
processing performance by exploiting the various packet size from a N2X tool.

CONCLUSION
Since the intrusion cannot be avoided fully, the deployment of intrusion forensics system is needed. As
described above, in a related research against a cyber-attack, since several months or more are expended in only
analyzing a cause of an intrusion event and there is no information necessary for analyzing an attack cause, it is
unable to know the cause of attack even after the intrusion event occurs. However, according to our proposed
system, entire packet data, flow data, and a PE file can be collected as evidence data from network traffic and
also stored in the storage medium for a long time, and thus, a cause of an intrusion event is quickly analyzed
based on the evidence data preserved in the storage medium. This paper described the architecture of cyber black
box system for network forensics and verified network throughput performance by deploying our proposed
system in an experimental testbed environment. The future work is the research of the cooperative mechanism
between our system and the security equipment such as IPSs (Intrusion Prevention Systems), WAFs (Web
Application Firewalls) and so on.
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